While there are many existing technologies to frustrate remote attackers, it can be fun to think up novel protections that might be used to layer on additional defences.
Consider, for instance, that remote code execution through attacks like buffer overflows depends on knowledge of the remote systems' instruction set. Knowledge of this instruction set allows attackers to carefully construct payloads designed to take over your systems through buffer overflow attacks and the like. But what if we were able to remove knowledge of the remote system ISA by essentially making it unguessable? Ladies and gentlemen, let me present to you the Moxie Mixie architecture...
Mixie is a variant of the Moxie that uses the same instruction set as Moxie, but with random instruction encodings, making it difficult for remote attackers to generate payloads for execution. Here's how it works. Consider this C source code:
int mycode (int a, int b)
return a + b;
Here's what it would assemble to normally with the moxie GNU tools:
0: 05 23 add $r0, $r1
2: 04 00 ret
To compile for the mixie variant, we need to assemble with the -mixie
option, and provide a random 128-bit key through the
environment variable. So, for instance....
$ MOXIE_MIXIE_KEY=123456789ABCDEF0 moxie-linux-as -mixie mycode.S
0: 05 23 77 5f add $r0, $r1
4: c6 1b
6: 04 00 c9 23 ret
a: 43 39
Note that each instruction now has an extra 32-bit suffix that is
randomly generated off of
MOXIE_MIXIE_KEY. We will always get those
same suffix values when we use the same key value. If we change the
$ MOXIE_MIXIE_KEY=ABABABABABABABAB moxie-linux-as -mixie mycode.S
...we get different instruction encodings....
0: 05 23 19 03 add $r0, $r1
4: 02 46
6: 04 00 52 f1 ret
a: 37 88
Now on the other side of this, we need to execute the code in a mixie-aware virtual machine. This can be any simulator environment, but QEMU in user mode is an interesting one. In this mode, QEMU will emulate the moxie mixie processor on Linux, but system calls are passed through to the host (x86) platform. Simply supply the same key to the simulator and instructions will be recognized and executed as expected. Supply the wrong key, and all you'll get are illegal instructions. The take away here is that remote attackers, without knowledge of the key, will have a difficult time generating a payload to initiate their attack.
Run-time generated code presents a challenge that is easily surmounted. For example, GCC trampolines and libffi both generate code at runtime and must have some way to generate instruction encodings based on the appropriate mixie key. In these cases, instead of generating the code directly, we can generate a code generator that asks the runtime (simulated mixie processor) to generate the code for us.
Note that we're not 'encrypting' the binaries. An attacker with access to mixie binaries will trivially be able to map out the instruction suffixes and generate shell code. All we're doing here is adding additional protections against remote attacks, where you have a reasonable chance to secure physical access to the binaries. We also can't protect against DoS attacks using this technology. If a remote attacker can insert instructions into the target system, illegal instruction crashes are certain to occur.
There are many interesting use cases, from embedded devices to traditional web services. Linux container technology, when combined with QEMU, provide the perfect mixie platform that can deployed anywhere regular docker containers can run. All you need is a moxie mixie linux userland and QEMU.
I'm interested in hearing feedack on this idea. Thanks for reading!